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Forget About It?   
Harmonizing European and American Protections for 
Privacy, Free Speech, and Due Process 
By Dawn Carla Nunziato* 
PRIVACY AND POWER (Cambridge University Press 2017) 
A.  Introduction 
In May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued its 
decision in the case of Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(Google Spain).  This is the now-famous “right to be forgotten” decision, in which the 
Court ruled that a search engine operator like Google must, upon request from a data 
subject, remove links that result from searches for an individual’s name when those 
results are “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the 
purposes . . . carried out by the operator of the search engine.”1  Since the decision was 
handed down, Google has received requests from European data subjects to remove over 
one million links to web sites containing information about them and has granted about 
40% of these requests, including in cases where the web sites at issue contained personal 
information about their medical, sexual, reproductive, or past criminal activity.2 Google 
has implemented the decision by removing links only within its European domains (such 
as Google.es or Google.de).  But data subjects have recently argued that these privacy 
protections also should apply to a search engine’s domains worldwide—to all of 
Google.com for example.  To date, European authorities have agreed that these privacy 
protections should be implemented globally.3  Further, the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party—composed of all the data protection authorities in the European Union—
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. I am very grateful to Lauren
Pyle and Ken Rodriguez for providing excellent research and library assistance in connection 
with this chapter.  I am also grateful to Professor Todd Peterson and Professor Russell Miller for 
their helpful comments on earlier drafts and to Dean Blake Morant for financial support of my 
research and writing. 
1 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 E.C.R. 
317, para. 94, [hereinafter Google Spain] available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131. 
2 See text accompanying notes 45 - 53.  
3 See, e.g., Samuel Gibbs, French data regulator rejects Google’s right-to-be-forgotten appeal, 
THE GUARDIAN (21 Sept. 2015), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/21/french-google-right-to-be-forgotten-appeal 
(explaining that French data protection authority Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des 
Libertés (CNIL) ordered Google to remove links to websites containing information on French 
data subjects from all Google domains, not just from country-specific domains like Google.fr, and 
CNIL’s president has rejected Google’s appeal of this order). 
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has determined that these privacy protections should be implemented globally and not 
just on EU domains.4 Can the European right to be forgotten be implemented in a manner 
that accords with U.S. constitutional rights? 
Many U.S. commentators responded to the Google Spain decision by claiming 
that it was patently inconsistent with the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee5 and 
could not withstand constitutional scrutiny in the United States.6  These commentators 
contend that if the U.S. passed a law granting individuals the right to demand that search 
engines remove links to web sites containing embarrassing, harmful, or offensive 
personal information about them, such a law would violate the First Amendment.7 
  These commentators are only partly correct.  They fail to recognize the long 
history within the United States of protecting individuals’ privacy rights—protections 
that have been rendered compatible with First Amendment freedoms.8  Indeed, for the 
past century, individuals in the United States have vindicated their privacy rights by 
bringing actions under the tort of public disclosure of private facts and similar invasion of 
privacy torts, and such claims have often prevailed over First Amendment challenges 
where the information at issue is not of legitimate interest to the public.9 Similarly, 
defamation and related laws allow individuals in the U.S. to vindicate their reputational 
and dignitary interests, and such claims have prevailed over First Amendment challenges 
where the information at issue is not of legitimate interest to the public and where the 
plaintiffs are not public figures.10  Contrary to these commentators’ assertions, the First 
Amendment does not grant the public an absolute right of access to information about 
other private individuals on matters that are not of public importance.  The free speech 
guarantee does not provide absolute protection for the free flow of information where the 
content at issue embodies harmful, offensive, or embarrassing information about matters 
not of public importance. Providing individuals with the right to have links to such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González” C-131/12, WP 225 (26 Nov. 2014), at 9 
[hereinafter Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party Guidelines], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf. 
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of 
speech…”). 
6 See, e.g., Andrew Hughes, Does the U.S. Have an Answer to the European Right to Be 
Forgotten?, 7 LANDSLIDE 18, 19 (2014) (“[B]oth supporters and detractors of the ECJ ruling 
agree that such a law is likely impossible in the United States.”); Eric Goldman, Primer on 
European Union’s Right To Be Forgotten, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (21 Aug. 2014) (“The ECJ 
ruling shocked many Americans because American law would not permit a similar result.”).  
7 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, NEW YORKER (29 Sept. 2014) (“The 
American regard for freedom of speech, reflected in the First Amendment, guarantees that the 
Costeja judgment would never pass muster under U.S. law.”); 
8 See text accompanying notes 54 – 64. 
9 See text accompanying notes 65 – 95. 
10 See text accompanying notes 64 – 92.  
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information about them removed from search engine results is therefore not necessarily 
inconsistent with substantive First Amendment freedoms.  
  The privacy protections recognized in the Google Spain decision are not 
necessarily incompatible with the substantive protections provided by U.S. free speech 
law and the balance U.S. courts have struck over time between privacy and free speech.  
Yet, as implemented, these privacy protections fail to comport with the procedural 
protections required under the U.S. Constitution.  The U.S. Constitution requires that 
“sensitive tools”11 be used to distinguish between protected speech and unprotected 
speech.  In particular, the party whose speech is being censored must be provided with 
notice and an opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision-maker before such 
censorship occurs.  Under the Google Spain decision, search engine operators like 
Google are required to remove links to information about a data subject without affording 
the publisher or content provider notice or an opportunity to be heard before such a 
removal decision is implemented. The European “right to be forgotten,” as it is currently 
implemented, is inconsistent with the procedural safeguards for speech required under the 
United States Constitution. 
B.  The CJEU’s  “Right to be Forgotten” 
The Google Spain case originated in 2010, when Spanish attorney Mario Costeja 
González became aware that a Google search of his name returned links to a Spanish 
newspaper’s 1998 archives containing a notice about the foreclosure of his home.12  
Costeja González claimed that this search result was in violation of his rights under the 
EU Data Protection Directive, which requires that personal data only be processed by 
data controllers insofar as the data is adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to 
the purpose for which the data is collected and processed.13  Costeja González initiated 
proceedings against the newspaper La Vanguardia (in which the foreclosure notice 
originally appeared) and against Google Spain and Google Inc. before the Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (Spanish Data Protection Agency).  Costeja González 
advanced two arguments.  First, he argued that the archived notice itself should be 
removed by the newspaper or altered so that his personal data no longer appeared in 
connection with the notice.14  Second, in the alternative, he argued that Google Spain and 
Google Inc. should be required to remove links to the notice when a search was 
performed on his name.15 
The Spanish Data Protection Agency rejected Costeja González’s complaint 
against La Vanguardia, observing that the publication of the notice was legally justified 
and indeed legally required by order of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, which 
mandated the publication of the auction notice so as to secure as many bidders as possible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963). 
12 See Google Spain, supra note 1, para. 7. 
13 See id., para. 14. 
14 See id., para. 15. 
 
15 See id. 
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on Costeja González’s foreclosed home.16 Accordingly, the actual content regarding 
Costeja González’s home foreclosure was not removed from the newspaper’s web site 
(and indeed remains there to this day17). But the Agency upheld the complaint against 
Google Spain and Google Inc., and required these search engines to stop linking to the La 
Vanguardia notice when Costeja González’s name was searched.18  Google Spain and 
Google Inc. brought actions challenging the Agency’s decision before the Audiencia 
Nacional (National High Court) of Spain, and that court stayed those proceedings and 
referred the relevant questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union.19   
On the questions referred regarding the application of the EU Data Protection 
Directive, the CJEU reached three conclusions.  First, the Court concluded that the search 
engine operators’ activities fell within the scope of “processing personal data.”20 Second, 
it held that a search engine operator is a “data controller.”21 And third, it concluded that 
the Directive applies to search engines based outside of Europe whose business operates 
and profits within Europe.22  On the basis of these rulings the Court held that Google Inc. 
and Google Spain were bound by the Directive to process personal data of European data 
subjects only insofar as the processing was “adequate, relevant, and not excessive in 
relation to the purpose for which it is collected and/or further processed.”23 Therefore, the 
Court held, a data subject may require a search engine to remove information that does 
not comply with these requirements.24 The Court concluded: 
[I]f it is found, following a request by the data subject . . . , 
that the inclusion in the list of results displayed following a 
search made on the basis of his name of the links to web 
pages published lawfully by third parties and containing 
true information relating to him personally is, at this point 
in time, incompatible with . . . the directive because that 
information appears, having regard to all the circumstances 
of the case, to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer 
relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes of the 
processing at issue carried out by the operator of the search 
engine, the information and links concerned in the list of 
results must be erased.25   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See id., para. 16. 
17See Subhasta D’immobles [Auction of Properties], LA VANGUARDIA (19 January 1998), 
available at http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/1998/01/19/pagina-
23/33842001/pdf.html. 
18 See Google Spain, supra note 1, para. 17. 
19 See id., para. 18. 
20 Id., para. 41. 
21 Id. 
22 See id., para. 60. 
23 Id.  
24 See id., para. 88. 
25 Id., para. 94 (emphasis added).  
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The Court qualified its ruling by observing that, in certain cases, the public’s interest in 
accessing information about an individual who has a role in public life may outweigh the 
data subject’s interest in having the link removed.26  It noted: “[i]f it appeared, for 
particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public life, that the 
interference with the [data subject’s] fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant 
interest of the general public in having … access to the information in question,” then the 
links should not be removed.27  Accordingly, the Court established a balancing test 
pursuant to which the search engine operator is required to weigh the data subject’s 
interests in removal against the interests of the general public in accessing information of 
genuine import to the public.28  In applying its balancing test, the Court concluded that 
the interests of the general public in accessing the information about Costeja González in 
this case did not outweigh his interests in securing removal of this information.  The 
Court explained:  “[S]ince in the case in point there do not appear to be particular reasons 
substantiating a preponderant interest of the public in having, in the context of such a 
search, access to that information . . . , the data subject may. . . require those links to be 
removed from the list of results.”29 
On the issue of how exactly a search engine operator is to implement delisting 
requests from data subjects, the Court ruled that European data subjects have the right to 
approach the search engine operator directly with their delisting claims under the 
Directive and that the search engines must then make a determination whether to grant or 
deny the delisting request.30  For this reason, the Court’s decision does not merely 
provide a right of action for data subjects to raise in courts of law; rather, it provides a 
right of action for data subjects to bring directly to the search engines themselves.  The 
search engines are required to implement a system for evaluating and complying with 
such requests.  As the Court explained, “the data subject may address such a request 
directly to the operator of the search engine (the controller), which must then duly 
examine its merits [and determine whether to grant or deny the request].”31 The Court’s 
decision requires search engines like Google to act as the decision-maker to determine 
whether to grant or deny a data subject’s delisting request in the first instance.32 
C.  Google’s Interpretation and Implementation of the Decision 
The Google Spain decision left a number of issues unresolved, even while search 
engine operators such as Google were expected to immediately implement a system to 
allow data subjects to submit delisting requests directly to the operators.  In an attempt to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See id., para. 97. 
27 Id. 
28 See id., para. 98. 
29 Id. 
30 See id., para. 77. 
31 Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No. 70/14, Luxembourg (13 May 2014), 
Judgment in Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-
05/cp140070en.pdf. 
32 See Massing chapter in this volume. 
 
	   6	  
secure further guidance on the substantive question of how to balance privacy interests 
against free speech interests, Google constituted a group of experts—the Advisory 
Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten—and charged them with identifying a list 
of factors that Google should take into account in responding to data subjects’ delisting 
requests.33  The Council proposed a list of criteria that Google should consider in 
implementing the CJEU’s decision. These criteria include: (1) the data subject’s role in 
public life (with private figures meriting greater privacy protection than public figures);34 
(2) the nature of the information (with information in the public interest—such as 
information relevant to political disclosure or relating to criminal activity—meriting 
greater free speech protections);35  (3) the source of the content and the motivation to 
publish it (with information provided by recognized bloggers or professional journalistic 
entities meriting greater free speech protections);36 and (4) the severity of a crime and the 
time that has elapsed since the crime occurred, in cases involving criminal activity (with 
the recentness and severity of crimes militating against delisting).37  
Google also sought guidance on the procedures it should follow when 
administering the delisting regime, including whether to provide the affected content 
provider with notice and an opportunity to be heard in the context of Google’s decision 
whether to delist the web site.38  The CJEU’s decision was silent on these matters, other 
than to insist that the search engine operator must duly examine the merits of the issue 
when the data subject brings a delisting request directly to the search engine operator.39  
The European advisory body on data protection and privacy—the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party—has determined that search engine operators should not 
inform content providers about an adverse decision even after it has been reached and has 
found that that there is “no legal basis” for giving notice in most circumstances.40   The 
Google Advisory Council acknowledged that it had received conflicting advice on the 
question of notice.  Still, the Google Advisory Council concluded that, as a matter of 
good practice, “the search engine should notify the publishers [of adverse delisting 
decisions that it had reached] to the extent allowed by law.”41  Google is apparently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See Final Report, Advisory Council to Google on the Right to be Forgotten, 6 Feb. 2015 
[hereinafter Google Advisory Report], available at https://www.google.com/advisorycouncil. 
34 See id. at 7. 
35 See id. at 9. 
36 See id. at 13. 
37 See id. at 14; see also Jodie Ginsburg, Advisory Council Meeting Brussels (Nov. 4, 2014) 
(“The current ability of searchers to find information about individuals who have had their 
conviction spent is incompatible with laws about rehabilitation, such as those in the UK.”). 
38 See Google Advisory Report, supra note 33, at 17. 
39 See text accompanying notes 16 – 32. 
40 Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party Guidelines, supra note 4, at 10 (“Search engines should 
not as a general practice inform the webmasters of the pages affected by de-listing of the fact that 
some webpages cannot be acceded from the search engine in response to specific queries… No 
provision in EU data protection law obliges search engines to communicate to original 
webmasters that results relating to their content have been de-listed. Such a communication is in 
many cases a processing of personal data and, as such, requires a proper legal ground in order to 
be legitimate.”). 
41 Google Advisory Report, supra note 33, at 17. 
	   7	  
adhering to this practice, and indicates in its Transparency Report that “[i]t is Google’s 
policy to notify a webmaster when pages from their site are removed from our search 
results based on a legal request.”42 Notably, the CJEU’s decision does not require search 
engine operators to provide notice of their delisting decisions.  The Court also did not 
require that the content provider be given an opportunity to be heard before a delisting 
decision is made.  The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has indicated that 
notice, even if provided after the fact, would not be authorized by law in most 
circumstances.43 This lack of emphasis on notice to affected content providers is in sharp 
contrast to the emphasis that the European privacy regime generally places on notice in 
the context of actions affecting privacy rights.44 
Since the Google Spain decision was handed down in May 2014, Google has 
received requests to remove links to over one million URLs, and has complied with 
approximately 40% of such requests, removing links to nearly 500,000 URLs.45   In its 
transparency report, Google has provided only general information about the types of 
removal requests it grants and the types that it denies.  Specific information about 
removal requests granted by Google is difficult to acquire, but can be obtained from some 
sources.  BBC News, for example, has created an archive of BBC web sites that have 
been delisted by Google upon request from data subjects.46 A review of Google’s 
transparency report and the BBC News archives of delisted websites provide a 
representative sample of the types of delisting requests Google has granted. 
Google has granted data subjects’ requests to remove links to websites containing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 EUROPEAN PRIVACY REQUESTS FOR SEARCH REMOVALS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, 
available at http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/faq. 
43 See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party Guidelines, supra note 4, at 10. 
44  See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, Article 2, section h, (“For the purposes of this Directive… ‘the data 
subject’s consent’ shall mean any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by 
which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed.”), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=en; Christine Nicholas, A Select Survey 
of International Data Privacy Laws, page 9, (“EU data controllers must tell data subjects what 
information will be and has been collected, why it was collected, who collected it and who can 
access it.”), available at http://www.moffatt.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/InternationalDataPrivacyLaws.pdf; Antonella Galetta and Paul de Hert, 
A European Perspective on Data Protection and Access Rights, page 7, (“…a proper protection 
of the data subjects’ rights is not only linked to the exercise of access rights, but also to the 
obligation of data controllers to notify data subject[s] about the processing of their personal 
data.”), available at http://irissproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/European-level-legal-
analysis-Final1.pdf. 
45  See EUROPEAN PRIVACY REQUESTS FOR SEARCH REMOVALS, available at 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en (last updated October 
14, 2015). 
46 See Neil McIntosh, List of BBC web pages which have been removed from Google’s search 
results [hereinafter BBC Delistings], available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/1d765aa8-600b-4f32-b110-d02fbf7fd379. 
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various types of personal information about them, including information about their 
criminal, medical, sexual, and reproductive histories. In the area of crime reporting, for 
example, Google has removed links to web pages about an individual who had been 
convicted of a serious crime but whose conviction was quashed on appeal.47  It has 
removed links to articles discussing a crime with the victim’s name listed, upon request 
from the victim of the crime.48 Google has removed links to news stories identifying a 
lesbian couple who conceived their children from sperm from an anonymous sperm 
donor.49  It removed links to a news story identifying a young woman with facial palsy, 
which included her first name and an accompanying picture of her and disclosed the fact 
that she attempted suicide.50 It removed links to an article identifying a woman who 
suffered from diabetes during her pregnancy and who did not receive proper prenatal care 
for this disease.51  It removed links to news stories about the experience of living with 
HIV that named and highlighted the experience of two individuals living with the virus.52  
It removed links to several articles quoting and describing the personal experiences and 
reproductive histories of individuals who had been diagnosed with testicular cancer.53  
Google appears to be working diligently to implement the delisting process 
mandated by the CJEU’s decision. And, in many cases, as I explore below, Google’s 
determination that the data subject’s privacy rights prevail over the content provider’s 
free speech interests might well comport with the outcome that would be reached under 
substantive U.S. law.  The First Amendment does not grant the public an absolute right to 
access information about other private individuals on matters that are not of public 
importance, and privacy law in the United States grants private individuals rights and 
remedies against the publication of embarrassing, harmful content that invades their 
privacy.  As I explain below, however, the process through which Google has 
implemented the CJEU’s decision fails to provide the procedural safeguards necessary 
for the protection of speech under the U.S. Constitution – and indeed under fundamental 
notions of due process shared by both the U.S. and the European legal systems. 
D.  Substantive Law: Balancing Privacy and Free Speech Rights within the United 
States 
The United States’ regime for protecting individual privacy—and for protecting 
freedom of expression—includes meaningful tools to protect individual privacy.  Courts 
have frequently held that individuals’ privacy rights under state or federal law trump 
publishers’ free speech rights.54  Indeed, individuals’ privacy rights have prevailed over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See EUROPEAN PRIVACY REQUESTS FOR SEARCH REMOVALS, supra note 45. 
48 See id. 
49  See BBC Delistings, supra note 46 (delisting 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8229401.stm). 
50  See id. (delisting http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/20357076/facial-palsy-left-me-
isolated-and-bullied). 
51 See id. (delisting http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/6390421.stm). 
52 See id. (delisting http://www.bbc.com/news/health-15982608). 
53 See id. (delisting http://www.bbc.co.uk/wales/bllcks/me_and_mine). 
54 See text accompanying notes 54 - 92. 
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free speech rights in circumstances similar to those in which Google is now granting 
delisting requests pursuant to its obligations under the Google Spain decision. First, 
federal laws such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act restrict the ability of consumer 
reporting agencies to report on bankruptcies and criminal proceedings that are beyond a 
certain number of years old.55 Second, expungement laws in almost every state allow 
individuals to have certain criminal records expunged—such that all records of the arrest 
or court case involving the crime are destroyed, sealed, or otherwise removed from the 
public record.56  Third, the common law of defamation grants private individuals 
meaningful rights and remedies against the publication of false information about them 
that damages their reputation.57  Fourth, and most significantly, common law privacy 
protections provide individuals with the power to effectively combat the publication of 
information about them that is embarrassing, harmful, or otherwise invasive of their 
privacy.58 Such privacy protections have been rendered compatible with the strong free 
speech and free press rights provided by the First Amendment.59  
The First Amendment does not erect a barrier to liability for publishing 
embarrassing, offensive, or other harmful private information about another, where that 
information is not a matter of legitimate public concern. The Supreme Court has made 
clear that, in balancing an individual’s privacy and reputational interests against free 
speech interests, the First Amendment’s strongest protections extend to information on 
matters of legitimate public concern, as distinguished from information of purely private 
concern.60   While the Court has held that the state may not “constitutionally punish 
publication of [truthful] information . . . about a matter of public significance,”61 it has 
also emphasized that the First Amendment’s strongest protections are reserved for 
information on matters of public significance or concern—not on matters of private 
significance or concern: “Speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First 
Amendment concern [than speech on matters of public concern].”62 In cases involving 
liability for or regulation of speech on matters of private concern the Court has ruled that 
"[t]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues [and] there is no 
potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-government.”63 
Accordingly, the Court has concluded that “[w]hile speech [on matters of private 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. See generally Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Privacy, 
Public Records, and the Constitution, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 6 (2002) (arguing that attempts to limit 
the use and accessibility of public records do not violate the First Amendment rights to access 
government information and to freedom of speech and press). 
56 George L. Blum, Annotation, Judicial Expunction of Criminal Record of Convicted Adult 
Under Statute, 69 A.L.R. 6th 1 (2011). 
57 See Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).  
58 See text accompanying notes 64 - 92. 
59 See text accompanying notes 60 - 95. 
60 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet v Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Daniel J. Solove, The 
Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Protections Against Disclosure, 53 Duke L.J. 967 (2003) 
(speech of private concern is less valuable than speech of public concern). 
61 Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).  
62 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985). 
63 Id. at 760. 
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concern] is not totally unprotected by the First Amendment, . . . its protections are less 
stringent.”64  
Today, under the privacy laws of most of the American states, the publication of 
offensive content about an individual on a matter of private concern constitutes an 
actionable invasion of privacy under the tort claim referred to as “the public disclosure of 
private fact.” As set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private 
life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion 
of privacy, if the matter is of a kind that: 
 
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and 
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.65 
Importantly, truth does not serve as an affirmative defense to a claim brought under this 
tort claim.66  Further, the First Amendment does not provide a defense to this tort where 
the content at issue is on a matter of private concern and is not of legitimate concern to 
the public or legitimately “newsworthy.”67  
This tort claim encompasses various types of invasions of privacy, including the 
making available of offensive personal information about an individual’s criminal, 
medical, or sexual history, or other aspects of one’s private life, if such information is not 
of legitimate concern to the public and if publication would be offensive to a reasonable 
person.68   There are many court decisions involving individuals who have successfully 
recovered damages for69 (or secured an injunction to prevent70) the publication of 
truthful, non-newsworthy, offensive information about them.71   An examination of 
representative recent cases demonstrates that the result reached by Google in balancing 
privacy against free speech interests in implementing its delisting regime is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Id. 
65 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (Am. Law Inst. 1977). 
66 See 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 175 (2011) (“Truth, while a defense to an action of libel, is not 
a defense to an action for an invasion of the right of privacy.”) (footnotes omitted). 
67 See, e.g., Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation 
of the Press, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 1039 (2009). 
68 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 1977) (“Sexual relations… are 
normally entirely private matters, as are family quarrels, many unpleasant or disgraceful or 
humiliating illnesses,… most details of a man's life in his home, and some of his past history that 
he would rather forget. When these intimate details of his life are spread before the public gaze in 
a manner highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man, there is an actionable invasion of his 
privacy, unless the matter is one of legitimate public interest.”). 
69 See text accompanying notes 74 – 94. 
70 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wisemen, 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969) (Court restrains the 
distribution of documentary film “Titicut Follies,” which showed inmates of state hospital for the 
criminally insane nude and in otherwise embarrassing detail, on the grounds that the documentary 
needlessly invaded the privacy of the mentally ill subjects). 
71 See text accompanying notes 74 - 94. 
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inconsistent with the balance that might be struck by courts in the United States in similar 
cases, notwithstanding the protections of the First Amendment.  U.S. courts have 
repeatedly held that the publication of embarrassing medical, sexual, reproductive, 
financial, or other private personal information may constitute the basis of a “public 
disclosure of private fact” tort claim and that such publication is not protected by the First 
Amendment.72 Plaintiffs may secure injunctive relief or damages for violation of their 
privacy rights in such circumstances.73 
The case of Doe v. Mills is illustrative.74  In that case, several women who were 
about to undergo abortions brought suit against individuals who were protesting outside 
an abortion clinic and who displayed plaintiffs’ names on large signs, indicating that the 
women were about to undergo this procedure while imploring them not to “kill their 
babies.” Ruling in the plaintiffs’ favor on their “public disclosure of private fact” tort 
claim, the court held that matters involving an individual’s reproductive decisions and 
medical treatment were private, and that, despite the fact that the subject of abortion in 
general was a matter of public concern, the identity of these women was a matter of 
private concern and defendants had no right to publish such information about them.75 
Similarly, courts have held that publication of matters involving an individual’s 
romantic or sexual relationships may form the basis of a “public disclosure of private 
fact” tort claim.  In Benz v. Washington Newspaper Publishing Co., the plaintiff—a CNN 
assignment editor—brought suit against a Washington newspaper for publishing a story 
in its gossip column about the plaintiff’s romantic and sexual relations.76  The court 
rejected the newspaper’s newsworthiness/First Amendment defense and ruled in the 
plaintiff’s favor on her “public disclosure of private fact” tort claim, holding that the 
plaintiff’s personal romantic life was not a matter of public concern.  Again, in Winstead 
v. Sweeney, the plaintiff brought a “public disclosure of private fact” tort action against a 
newspaper for its publication of a feature article on “unique love relationships” in which 
the plaintiff’s ex-husband was quoted revealing personal facts about her sexual and 
reproductive history, including that she had had several abortions and had joined him in 
“swapping” partners with another couple.77 Reversing the trial court’s holding that the 
First Amendment protected the newspaper’s publication of the story, the appellate court 
held that the article at issue was not necessarily newsworthy.78  
Courts have also held that the publication of information about an individual’s 
medical treatment can form the basis of a “public disclosure of private fact” tort claim. A 
recent case from Georgia involving the publication of hair transplant photographs is 
illustrative.  In Zieve v. Hairston, Celento Hairston sued Ronald Zieve and the National 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 See text accompanying notes 72 - 92. 
73 See 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969) (granting injunctive relief) and text accompanying notes 74 –
92 (discussing cases granting damages). 
74 212 Mich. App. 73, 77 (1995). 
75 See id. at 84. 
76 See 34 Media L. Rep. 2368 (2006). 
77 205 Mich. App. 664, 677 (1994). 
78 Id. at 674. 
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Hair Transplant Specialists for airing television commercials depicting before and after 
pictures of Hairston’s hair replacement treatments.79  Although Hairston had consented to 
the pictures being broadcast in a limited geographic area, he did not consent to their 
broadcast near his Georgia home where he had taken steps to keep his hair replacement 
treatments a secret.80  Ruling in Hairston’s favor, the court held that all three elements of 
the “public disclosure of private fact” tort claim had been met: “(1) the disclosure of 
private facts was a public one; (2) the facts disclosed were private, secluded, or secret 
facts; and (3) the matter made public was offensive and objectionable to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities under the circumstances.”81  
In a similar case involving the broadcast of truthful but embarrassing information, 
a Florida court in Doe v. Universal Television Group ruled in favor of a woman who had 
undergone a botched facelift.82  In that case Doe had agreed to be interviewed on camera 
in the context of a program about overseas facelift surgeries that had gone wrong, on the 
condition that her identity—including her image and her voice—be rendered 
unidentifiable.83 When the broadcast instead revealed her face and voice in a manner that 
made it possible to identify her, Doe brought a “public disclosure of private fact” tort 
action against the broadcaster.  The court ruled in her favor, rejecting the broadcaster’s 
newsworthiness/First Amendment defense.84   
In another case involving the broadcast of an individual’s likeness, in Multimedia 
WMAZ v. Kubach, an AIDS patient prevailed against a television station that aired seven 
seconds of his face in the context of a story about AIDS, in violation of the station’s 
express promise to depict his face in a manner that was unrecognizable.85  The case 
Huskey v. NBC also fits with this jurisprudence.86  In that case the court ruled that a 
prisoner in a federal penitentiary could proceed with his “public disclosure of private 
fact” lawsuit against NBC for filming him working out in the prison’s exercise room 
wearing only shorts and with several distinctive tattoos exposed.87  The court rejected 
NBC’s newsworthiness/First Amendment defense and ruled that Huskey, although a 
prisoner, did not forgo his privacy rights in his image.88  
Individuals have also successfully brought “public disclosure of private fact” 
cases in U.S. courts based on the publication of information about their reproductive and 
sexual practices and choices.  For example, in Y.G. v. Jewish Hospital of St. Louis, the 
plaintiffs brought suit against a hospital and a television station for broadcasting images 
of them attending a hospital function commemorating the success of an in vitro 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 See 266 Ga. App. 753 (2004). 
80 Id. at 757. 
81 Id. at 756. 
82 See 717 So. 2d 63 (1988). 
83 Id. at 64.  
84 Id. at 65.  
85 See 212 Ga. App. 707 (1994). 
86 See 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D.Ill. 1986). 
87 See id. at 1292. 
88 See id. 
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fertilization program in which they had participated.89  Although the plaintiffs openly 
attended the function, they had been assured by the hospital that only persons involved in 
the IVF program would attend and that no publicity would result.90  Rejecting the 
station’s newsworthiness/First Amendment defense, the court ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs on their public disclosure of private fact claim.91   
  U.S. courts have also held that the publication of personal financial information 
can form the basis of a “public disclosure of private fact” claim. In Johnson v. Sawyer, 
for example, Johnson successfully sued the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the 
United States government for the disclosure of information from Johnson’s tax returns.92  
Johnson had pleaded guilty to crimes involving financial impropriety and had disclosed 
the financial information at issue to the IRS.93  Still, the court held that he had not waived 
his privacy interest in such information and that his financial information was not of 
legitimate concern to the public.94  
  In sum, privacy law in the United States generally provides individuals with 
meaningful rights and remedies in circumstances where their personal information has 
been disclosed or published by another in a manner that is offensive, notwithstanding the 
protections accorded by the First Amendment.  Individuals have successfully invoked the 
“public disclosure of private fact” tort in many instances to vindicate their privacy 
interests in their medical, sexual, reproductive, financial and other personal information, 
and the First Amendment provides no defense for those who publish95 or disclose 
information that would be highly offensive to the reasonable person and is not of 
legitimate concern to the public.  The balance struck by Google in responding to 
hundreds of thousands of delisting requests after the Google Spain decision is not 
necessarily dissimilar to or inconsistent with the balance that has been struck by U.S. 
courts in weighing privacy and free speech rights.  
E.  Procedural Law: According Due Process to Parties Whose Free Speech Rights 
Are Affected 
The balance Google has struck between privacy and free speech rights when 
responding to delisting requests under the Google Spain decision may not be inconsistent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
90 See id. at 492. 
91 See id. at 503. 
92 See 129 F.3d 1307 (5th Cir. 1997). 
93 See id. at 1309. 
94 See id. at 1324. 
95 Notably, U.S. statutory law provides search engines and other Internet intermediaries with 
immunity for hosting content that invades the privacy of others. See Communications Decency 
Act, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230(c); Carafano v. Metrosplash, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (interpreting 
Section 230(c) to require dismissal of plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim against dating 
website).  But this statutory immunity accorded under Section 230(c) is not mandated by the First 
Amendment, and may be amended. See, e.g., Petition to Amend Communications Decency Act 
Section 230, available at https://www.change.org/p/the-u-s-senate-amend-communications-
decency-act-section-230. 
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with substantive First Amendment freedoms.  But the procedures Google has followed 
when implementing the CJEU’s Google Spain decision are inconsistent with the due 
process provisions of the U.S. Constitution96 -- and with fundamental, shared notions of 
due process generally.97 A fundamental component of due process is that individuals be 
accorded notice and an opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision-maker before a 
decision affecting their rights is rendered.98  Even assuming that Google is such an 
impartial decision-maker,99 the procedure by which it is administering delisting decisions 
is deficient because—pursuant to the guidance provided by European data protection 
authorities—Google provides neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard to the affected 
content providers before their free speech rights are determined. The Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party concluded that the provision of notice to affected content 
providers regarding a delisting decision is problematic and has no basis in law.100  While 
Google is apparently attempting to provide notice to affected content providers after it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person… be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law…”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…”); and text accompanying 
notes 105 – 128 (setting forth procedures required under the Due Process Clauses before 
fundamental rights – including free speech rights – may be abridged). 
97 See text accompanying notes 109 – 113 (discussing due process rights under the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights). 
98 See, e.g., Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“In most 
circumstances procedural due process principles require the state to provide an individual with 
notice and a hearing before an impartial decision-maker prior to the deprivation of a life, liberty, 
or property interest.”); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)(“[w]hen someone’s . . 
. liberty . . . interest is going to be taken by the government, procedural due process principles 
normally will require that the person receive notice and a hearing prior to the deprivation of the 
constitutionally protected interest”); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950) (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is 
to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections.”).  
99 Impartial decision-makers are those that do not have bias or predisposition against either 
affected party or side. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (“The Due 
Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and 
criminal cases… ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a 
proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to 
find against him.”); 3 Treatise on Const. L. § 17.8(g) (“Decision makers are constitutionally 
unacceptable where they have a personal monetary interest in the outcome of the adjudication or 
where they are professional competitors of the individual”). 
100 See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party Guidelines, supra note 4, at 3. The Article 29 
Working Party has concluded that no notice or opportunity to be heard can or should be provided 
to the content providers. In its guidelines, the Working Party concluded that “[s]earch engines 
should not as a general practice inform the webmasters of the pages affected by de-listing of the 
fact that some web pages cannot be accessed from the search engine in response to a specific 
name-based query. There is no legal basis for such routine communication under EU data 
protection law.” Id.  
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has reached an adverse decision,101 such after-the-fact notice is insufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of due process.  
This lack of prior notice to individuals whose free speech rights are implicated is 
problematic and indeed is in sharp contrast to the emphasis European privacy law places 
on according notice to individuals before their privacy rights are implicated.  Under 
European law, those responsible for controlling data are required to provide meaningful 
notice to a data subject before processing a data subject’s personal data – including what 
data will be collected, why it was collected, who collected it, and who can access it.102 
Indeed, the pre-eminent value on which the EU Data Protection Directive was founded is 
the principle of notice to affected data subjects.103 It is therefore particularly problematic 
that decision-makers like Google, in the context of implementing the CJEU’s Google 
Spain decision, are not required to provide notice to affected individuals before their free 
speech rights are implicated. 
Providing notice after the fact to individuals or entities whose rights are adversely 
affected without according them an opportunity to be heard before a decision affecting 
their rights is rendered—while better than no notice at all—is inconsistent with the 
fundamental requirements of the rule of law and principles of due process.  A 
fundamental component of living under the rule of law is that an individual should be 
accorded due process in connection with the determination of his or her rights.  Due 
process of law requires that an individual be granted the opportunity to be heard and to 
state her case to an impartial decision-maker before she is deprived of her fundamental 
rights—including her right to freedom of expression.104 The United States Constitution’s 
Due Process provisions require that individuals be provided with fundamental protections 
before the state can abridge their right to freedom of expression. Fundamental principles 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101  See EUROPEAN PRIVACY REQUESTS FOR SEARCH REMOVALS: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS, available at http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/faq. 
 
102 See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, Article 2, section h, (“For the purposes of this Directive… ‘the data 
subject’s consent’ shall mean any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by 
which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed.”) 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=en; Christine Nicholas, A Select Survey 
of International Data Privacy Laws, page 9, (“EU data controllers must tell data subjects what 
information will be and has been collected, why it was collected, who collected it and who can 
access it.”) available at http://www.moffatt.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/InternationalDataPrivacyLaws.pdf; Antonella Galetta and Paul de Hert, 
A European Perspective on Data Protection and Access Rights, page 7, (“…a proper protection 
of the data subjects’ rights is not only linked to the exercise of access rights, but also to the 
obligation of data controllers to notify data subject[s] about the processing of their personal 
data.”) available at http://irissproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/European-level-legal-
analysis-Final1.pdf. 
103 See Margaret Rouse, EU Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC), available at 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.co.uk/definition/EU-Data-Protection-Directive. 
104 See text accompanying notes 114 – 128. 
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of due process require that any such deprivation of individuals’ right to freedom of 
expression occur only as a result of a fair, independent, and impartial decision-making 
process in which affected parties are provided with meaningful notice and an opportunity 
to be heard before a decision is rendered. 
The right to due process of law in general is of ancient origin and has its roots in 
early English and American law.  The right can be traced to Magna Carta, which provides 
that “No freeman shall be … disseised … of his liberties…except … by the law of the 
land.”105  One of the earliest express provisions for such procedural protections of 
individual rights is provided in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which 
provides that “no person shall … be deprived of . . . liberty … without due process of 
law.”106  Similar language was included in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, providing that “No State shall . . .  deprive any person of . . . liberty …, 
without due process of law.”107 Since the 1800s, procedural due process has been linked 
to the concept of the rule of law, in both the U.S. Constitution and subsequently in 
international and European instruments as well.108  
In the mid-twentieth century, the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights recognized the importance of protecting due process rights, providing in Article 
10 that “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations . . . 
.”109  The European Convention on Human Rights was the first international human rights 
instrument to set forth detailed protections for due process and fair trial rights. With 
respect to the determination of civil rights and obligations, Article 6 of the European 
Convention provides for the general right to procedural fairness, including a hearing 
before a fair, independent, and impartial tribunal that provides a reasoned judgment.  
Specifically, Article 6(1) states that “In the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations . . ., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”110 Article 14 of the 
International Covenant similarly provides, “[i]n the determination of . . . his rights and 
obligations . . . , everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”111  In each of these foundational 
documents and instruments, procedural due process rights and the right to independent, 
impartial, and fair judicial determinations of one’s civil and human rights are recognized 
as necessary for the meaningful protection of substantive rights, including the right to 
freedom of expression.  Article 6 of the European Convention guarantees procedural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 RICHARD CLAYTON QC & HUGH TOMLINSON QC, THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 708 (2009) 
(quoting clause 39 of Magna Carta of 1215) [hereinafter Clayton & Tomlinson]. 
106 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
107 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
108 See Clayton & Tomlinson, supra note 105, at 709. 
109 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 10, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
110  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 
6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
111 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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fairness “whenever there is a ‘determination’ of a ‘civil right or obligation.’”112 The 
European Court of Human Rights has emphasized the centrality of the rights of 
procedural due process articulated in Article 6(1) and has affirmed that an expansive 
view of these rights is fundamental to protecting civil and human rights: 
In a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention the right to 
a fair administration of justice holds such a prominent place that a 
restrictive interpretation of Article 6(1) would not correspond to the aim 
and purpose of that provision.113 
U.S. courts have repeatedly emphasized the importance of due process protections and 
have held that such protections apply specifically in the context of the deprivation of 
one’s right to freedom of expression. As constitutional commentators Rotunda and 
Nowak explain, 
In their procedural aspects, the due process clauses require 
that the government not restrict a specific individual's 
freedom to exercise a fundamental constitutional right 
without a process to determine the basis for the restriction. . 
. [In particular,] whenever the government seeks to restrain 
speech, there must be a prompt procedure to determine 
whether the speech may be limited in conformity with First 
Amendment principles.114  
Before the state deprives an individual of a substantial liberty interest such as the right to 
freedom of expression, the individual must be accorded: adequate notice of the basis for 
government action; an opportunity to be heard by the decision-maker; and a 
determination by an impartial decision-maker.115 Importantly, when the state seeks to 
authorize a restriction on an individual’s freedom of expression, prior notice to that 
individual must be provided: “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due 
process in any proceeding … is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 
to appraise interested parties of the . . .  action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections.”116 In summary, a basic requirement of due process of law is that 
individuals be accorded notice and an opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision-
maker before a decision adversely affecting their rights is rendered. 
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In addition, First Amendment jurisprudence embodies its own requirements of 
due process. The First Amendment’s protection for freedom of expression not only 
embodies a substantive dimension of which categories of speech to protect; it also 
embodies procedural dimensions, which require that “sensitive tools” be implemented by 
decision-makers to determine whether the speech at issue is protected or unprotected.117  
As free speech theorist Henry Monaghan explains, “procedural guarantees play an 
equally large role in protecting freedom of speech; indeed, they assume an importance 
fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be applied.”118  U.S. courts 
have constructed a powerful “body of procedural law which defines the manner in which 
they and other bodies must evaluate and resolve [free speech] claims — [establishing] a 
First Amendment due process.”119 In implementing the First Amendment’s protections 
for free speech, courts have developed “a comprehensive system of procedural safeguards 
designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.”120 
Under the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, any government-
mandated restriction of speech must be accompanied by review by an impartial decision-
maker and such review must afford the affected parties notice and an opportunity to be 
heard before the decision-maker renders its decision.121 The Court’s decision in Bantam 
Books v. Sullivan is illustrative.122  This case involved a system for determining which 
books were legal and which were illegal—in the absence of a procedure that accorded the 
affected speakers notice and an opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision-maker. 
In that case, the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth was charged 
with investigating and recommending prosecution of booksellers for the distribution of 
obscene or indecent printed works.123 The Commission reviewed books and magazines in 
circulation, and notified distributors in cases in which a book or magazine had been 
distributed that the Commission found objectionable and for which removal from 
distribution was ordered. 124  In reviewing the constitutionality of this scheme, the 
Supreme Court first explained that “the separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech 
calls for . . . . sensitive tools” and insisted that any such restriction on expression must 
“scrupulously embody the most rigorous procedural safeguards.” 125  The Court 
condemned the fact that, under the scheme at issue, “the publisher or distributor is not 
even entitled to notice and hearing before his publications are listed by the Commission 
as objectionable [and ordered for removal],” as well as the fact that there was “no 
provision whatever for judicial superintendence before notices issue or even for judicial 	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review of the Commission’s determinations of objectionableness.” 126  The Court 
concluded that, in the absence of these essential procedural safeguards, the “procedures 
of the Commission are radically deficient” and unconstitutional.127  Courts have similarly 
held that restrictions on Internet speech that fail to accord these procedural safeguards are 
constitutionally deficient.  In CDT v. Pappert, for example, the court held 
unconstitutional a statute that required the blocking of web sites that allegedly hosted 
child pornography, where the affected content provider was not provided with notice and 
an opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision-maker before the blocking became 
effective.128  
The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the importance of providing 
affected individuals with notice and an opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision-
maker before an individual’s right to free speech is abridged.  Absent such procedural 
safeguards, state-authorized restrictions on expression are unconstitutional.  Under the 
First Amendment, notice, opportunity to be heard, and a fair determination of one’s free 
speech rights by an impartial decision-maker are essential procedural safeguards.  
In summary, both the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and 
the First Amendment itself require that before an individual’s speech is restricted through 
a state-authorized process—including the regime being implemented by Google pursuant 
to the mandates of the CJEU’s Google Spain decision—affected parties must be accorded 
notice and have an opportunity to be heard in an impartial decision-making proceeding.  
European data privacy law similarly recognizes the importance of providing notice to 
parties whose civil rights are implicated. Indeed, the requirement of prior notice is an 
essential element of fundamental conceptions of due process shared by both the U.S. and 
European legal systems. Even if—and this is a big if—Google is considered to be an 
impartial decision-maker, the current process for evaluating and implementing data 
subjects’ removal requests is radically deficient because it fails to provide affected 
content providers with notice and an opportunity to the heard before an adverse decision 
is rendered – foundational requirements of due process under both the U.S. and European 
systems. 
F.  Conclusion 
Most U.S. commentators on the CJEU’s right to be forgotten decision have 
contended that such a right is incompatible with the First Amendment because they 
mistakenly believe that free speech rights always outweigh privacy rights in the United 
States.  These commentators misunderstand the balance that U.S. courts have struck 
between privacy rights and free speech rights.  They fail to recognize that courts in the 
U.S. have protected individuals’ privacy rights under the “public disclosure of private 
fact” tort and that such protections for privacy have been held to be compatible with the 
First Amendment’s protections for free speech.  In this chapter, I have highlighted a 	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different incompatibility between the CJEU decision and U.S. constitutional rights—one 
that emphasizes the procedural protections required under the U.S. Constitution for 
individuals’ fundamental rights – and indeed under fundamental requirements of due 
process shared by both the U.S. and European legal systems. The privacy protections 
recognized in the CJEU’s decision are not necessarily incompatible with the substantive 
protections provided by U.S. free speech law and the balance U.S. courts have struck 
between privacy and free speech.  But the CJEU’s mandate regarding search engine 
operators’ implementation of these protections fails to comport with the fundamental 
requirements of due process -- that the party whose speech is affected be provided with 
notice and an opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision-maker before a decision 
adversely affecting such rights is rendered.  As the Google Spain decision’s privacy 
protections are currently being implemented, search engine operators like Google are 
required to remove links to information about a data subject without affording the 
affected speaker notice or an opportunity to be heard before such a removal decision is 
implemented. The right to be forgotten, as implemented, is therefore inconsistent with 
fundamental, shared notions of due process. 
 
